In this paper, we examine the effects of property rights protection on corporate innovative activities. Using a unique 2003 World Bank survey of over 2400 firms in 18 Chinese cities, we obtain the following findings: (1) property rights protection is positively and significantly related to corporate innovative activity (for both process and product R&D); (2) government services and helping hand are conducive to corporate R&D, while informal payments to government officials are not; and (3) government ownership of firms and direct appointment of CEOs are important determinants of corporate R&D. We also find that corporate R&D is positively related to firm size, and access to finance, but negatively related to product market competition and firm age. We provide a theoretical framework and some policy implications of the findings.
Introduction
The most important question in the field of economic growth and development is: Why are some countries much poorer than others? Traditional neoclassical theory, following Solow (1956) , explain differences in income per capita in terms of different saving rates or some exogenous factors such as total factor productivity. Recent theory of economic growth, following Romer (1986 Romer ( , 1990 and Lucas (1988) , endogenizes steady-state growth and technical progress.
According to the model of Romer (1990) , e.g., a country may be more prosperous than another if it allocates more resources to R&D.
Most recently, a new approach to studying economic growth and development has emerged which emphasizes the role of economic institutions (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2002 Acemoglu et al., , 2005 Barro 1990; Beck et al., 2005; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Djankov et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 1998 , 2002 . This new approach takes the view that the classical theories of economic growth, while providing many insights about the mechanics of economic growth, seem unable to provide a fundamental explanation for economic growth and development (Acemoglu, 2005) . As North and Thomas (1973, p. 2) put it, "the factors we have listed (innovation, economies of scale, education, capital accumulation etc.) are not causes of growth; they are growth" (italics in original). According to the aforementioned new studies, the fundamental explanation of comparative growth is differences in institutions.
Of particular importance to economic outcomes are the economic institutions such as the protection of property rights and the presence and perfection of market 1 . Property rights are important because they influence one's incentive to invest in tangible or intangible capital or adopt more advanced technology (Claessens and Laeven, 2003) . In his influential book, North (1990) views property and contract rights as key to channeling resources toward productive investments: "The inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World." Recent studies show that strong property rights protection and contract enforcement enhance corporate governance, firm valuation, investments in physical and financial assets, asset allocation and thereby economic growth (e.g. Barro, 1990; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Cull and Xu, 2005; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Johnson et al. 2002; Knack and Keefer, 1995; King and Levine, 1993; Mauro, 1995) .
2
This literature, however, has not yet touched on the effects of structure and protection of property rights on firm incentives to conduct R&D which aims at producing new products and new technologies, which are essential for long-run and sustainable economic growth. Our paper tries to fill this void in the literature.
Following the recent literature (e.g., Johnson et al., 2002; Cull and Xu, 2005; Levine, 2005) on property rights and finance, we measure property rights security at various dimensions and examine the effects of property rights protection on corporate R&D. Levine (2005) summarizes the security of property rights into two important dimensions: (1) an active government that enforces property rights, facilitates private contracting, and applies the law and rule fairly to everyone; and (2) a government that sufficiently constraints itself from coercion and informal payments. Using a unique set of World Bank survey data of Chinese firms in 18 cities in 2003, these two dimensions can be measured by a series of variables that are constructed based on firms' perceptions about property rights protection, contract enforcement and government grabbing hand/helping hand. 3 Moreover, following Cull and Xu (2005) we measure 2 For example, Barro's (1990) classic empirical study on the effects of political instability, which he interpreted as "adverse influences on property rights", found that frequencies of revolutions, coups, and political assassinations are negatively related to the growth rate and to private investment. Using broader measures of the quality of governance, including measures of corruption, bureaucratic quality, rule of law, informal payments risk, Mauro (1995) , Knack and Keefer (1995) , and Keefer and Knack (1997) found further evidence that improved quality of governance promotes economic growth. King and Levine (1993) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) , among others, present similar evidence with regard to investment in financial assets. Johnson et al. (2002) and Cull and Xu (2005) find that property rights protection is positively associated with firm's profit reinvestment rate. 3 The 18 cities range from developed coastal cities such as Shenzhen and Hangzhou to relatively backward cities such as Lanzhou and Guiyang, providing a rich sample of cities at different levels of property rights protection and government efficiency. Similar measures have been used in Johnson et al. (2002) and Cull and Xu (2005) .
the security of property rights at the firm level as different types of corporate ownership and control. As Jefferson and Rawski (2002) and Cull and Xu (2005) point out, state ownership is often associated with vaguely defined property rights, a higher level of informal payments risk, greater chance of political intervention, and the pursuit of non-economic objectives at the expense of other shareholders and thus implies a low level of property rights security. We obtain the following empirical results. First, measures of property rights protection-for instance, the likelihood that the legal system will uphold contracts and property rights-have a positive and significant relationship with corporate R&D intensity. Second, corporate R&D investments are positively and significantly related to the extent of the government's helping hand. We also find that compared with state ownership, both private and foreign ownership facilitate corporate R&D in China. Government appointment of CEOs of stated owned enterprises also has a negative impact on firm R&D.
Following the approach of North (1990) and the subsequent studies, we view firm R&D decisions as responses to the "rules of the game in society" that "structure incentives in human exchange". As basic rules in a market economy, property rights (including IPRs) protection and contract enforcement affect corporate incentives for investments of all kind, both in tangible and intangible assets. While IPRs laws and enforcements provide necessary protection to the fruits of R&D (patent, copyrights, trademarks, etc.), broader property rights protection and contract enforcements protect investments that are complementary to R&D expenditures, especially during the post-R&D stage, and hence help realize the commercial values of R&D. The unique firm-level information in our dataset enables us to examine empirically the effects of property rights protection and contract enforcement on R&D Government services can also have a significant effect on corporate R&D, especially in developing countries where market mechanisms are generally not perfect and a large range of economic transactions and contract enforcement are affected, either positively or negatively, by the "visible hand". On the one hand, by extending a "helping hand" to corporations, government services are conducive to a firm's economic activities, including R&D investments. On the other hand, the government sometimes places a "grabbing hand" on business enterprises by, e.g.
introducing new policies, imposing regulations that increase the costs of doing business 4 .
Sometimes government officials even demand informal payments from firms. 5 Such a grabbing hand tends to hinder firm incentive to innovate by lowering the returns of R&D.
Furthermore, state ownership of firm property and government direct control of firms via CEO appointment, which are common in developing countries, can have a big influence over corporate R&D decisions. First, the government may directly own shares of an enterprise as a means to foster employment or fulfill other social goals, which may in turn impact a firm's R&D decisions. 6 Managers of state-owned or state-controlled firms also tend to give higher priority to the demands of bureaucrats than to those of minority stakeholders, simply because of the influence bureaucrats have over their employment contracts. When firms are dominated by bureaucrats who pursue their own private interests, the risk of CEO turnover or demotion is likely to be decoupled from a firm's performance, and instead influenced by how well CEOs serve the private interests of the bureaucrats. Furthermore, SOE managers have weak or sometimes adverse innovative incentives to improve firm competitiveness, since as public employees, they cannot personally reap the benefits of increasing competitiveness, yet they will bear many of the costs of the R&D (e.g., uncertainty of the investment and angry workers) (Megginson, 2005) . For the above reasons, the effects of government ownership and direct 4 As pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p.601) , "an important reason why many of these permits and regulations exist is probably to give officials the power to deny them and to collect bribes in return for providing the permits". 5 Such informal payments are usually ways to bribe government officials. In many cases they are disguised as different types of fees, trip offerings, expense money, home decorating assistance, or gambling activities. 6 In their survey of corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that SOEs are actually controlled by bureaucrats who have extremely concentrated control rights but no significant cash flow rights, since the latter are widely dispersed amongst the country's taxpayers. Bureaucrats' main concerns are to achieve their political objectives and to secure their economic benefits, which are often quite different from the objective of increasing SOEs' competitiveness and maximizing profits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) . Therefore, state owners are thought to be unwilling to undertake high-risk and long-term R&D projects because the cost of doing so is much greater than the political/electoral payoff of modestly improving SOE competitiveness and performance (Megginson, 2005 There have been extensive studies of the effects of intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection on R&D in developing countries during the past two decades, often in a North-South framework (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Helpman, 1993; Glass and Saggi, 2002; Branstetter, Fisman and Foley 2006) . The recent work of Chen and Puttitanum (2005) derived in their theoretical model and then confirmed with international data that a developing country's optimal level of IPRs, one best trading off encouraging domestic firms' imitation of foreign technology and promoting domestic R&D, can exhibit a U-shaped relationship with its levels of economic development. This literature on R&D and economic development, however, has focused mostly on protection of IPRs, and not paid much attention to broad property rights protection, which is the focus of our paper. study also adds to the recent studies on firm R&D in China (e.g., Hu and Jefferson, 2004; Hu, Jefferson, and Qian, 2005) to IV analysis with reasonably exogenous instruments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical framework to analyze the role of property rights protection and the government in corporate R&D activities.
Section 3 discusses the World Bank survey data and presents the data and variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
A Theoretical Framework
As mentioned in the Introduction, our analysis goes beyond the standard arguments of legal protection of intellectual property rights; we examine the effects of broad property rights protection on corporate R&D. We view R&D investments as responses to the basic "rules of the game" in society which define property rights protections, the most fundamental element of economic institutions. To summarize, strong property rights protection facilitates corporate innovative activities.
The helping hand extended by the government also helps corporations innovate. By contrast, the potential informal payments of firm profits by the government (the grabbing hand) are detrimental to corporate incentives to innovate. Finally, whether direct government ownership encourages a firm to innovate depends on the trade-off between the government's goal of maintaining stable employment and other social objectives. In the following sections, we use data from China to examine these implications empirically.
Data and Variables

Sample
Most data used in the study come from the business environment and enterprise performance survey conducted jointly by the World Bank and the Enterprise Survey
Organization of China in early 2003. To achieve a balanced representation of enterprises, the sample includes about 2,400 enterprises from the following 18 cities across five regions in China:
(1) the Central Region: Changsha, Nanchang, Wuhan, and Zhengzhou; (2) the Northeast Region:
Benxi, Changchun, Dalian, and Harbin; (3) the Northwest Region: Lanzhou and Xi'an; (4) the Southwest Region: Chongqing, Guiyang, Kunming, and Nanning; and (5) Table 1 provides summary statistics of the key variables that we describe below.
[Insert Table 1 here]
R&D investment
The R&D measure is the dependent variable in our analysis. We construct two widely used measures of R&D using data from the survey. The first measure is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm made positive investment in R&D in a specific year (R&D Dummy), while the second measure is the amount of R&D spending as a percentage of total sales (R&D Intensity).
Overall, more than 25% of the enterprises reported making positive R&D investment during the survey periods (Table 1 ). As Table 2 shows, the responses vary substantially across cities. For instance, over 50% of the enterprises in the coastal Hangzhou city report making positive R&D investment, while less than 10% of the enterprises in Lanzhou in the west part of China invested in R&D. R&D intensity in the surveyed cities (for R&D active enterprises) ranges from 0.5% to 2.9%, which are not low by the Chinese standards.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Cull and Xu (2005) explore the impact of property rights protection and firm access to finance on profit reinvestment using the same dataset as ours and find significant relationships between property rights protection, access to finance and profit reinvestment. Generally speaking, profit reinvestment could be used to finance R&D activity. However, we find that the correlation coefficient between R&D intensity and profit reinvestment rate is a very modest amount, 7.18%.
In fact, Cull and Xu (2005) report that firm owners in the sample reinvest 27% of their profits on average,whil e in our study the average ratio of R&D spending to sales is only 0.6%. This discrepancy might be due to the fact that profits are much smaller than sales. For instance, based on our sample average ROS (13.88%), the R&D intensity would be around 4.2% (0.6%* (1/13.88%)) if it is scaled by profits.
To get a more thorough understanding of the potential relationship between profit reinvestment and R&D variables in the dataset, we compare their values across firms with various sizes in detail. We find that larger firms are more likely to invest in R&D and tend to invest more. Nevertheless, the profit reinvestment rate is very similar and stable across firms with different sizes. For instance, for small firms (number of employee < 100), the mean reinvestment rate is 16.11%; 13.6% of the firms invest in R&D and the mean R&D intensity is 0.51%. In contrast, for medium size firms (100<number<300), the mean reinvestment rate is 19.85%; while 29.4% of the firms invest in R&D and the mean R&D intensity is 0.66%. For large firms (number of employee >300), the mean reinvestment rate is 18.33%; while 45.8% of the firms invest in R&D and the mean intensity is 6.9%. For brevity, the detailed comparisons are not reported in the tables but are available from the authors.
(Chen, it just occurred to me that we classify firms here as L, M, and S here, whereas later on in Table 8 as two groups (above and below mean). Hope this will not cause referees to ask for consistency. They should understand that these are not crucial. )
The weak correlation between R&D investment and profit reinvestment found in our sample can be understood as follows. On the one hand, while retained profits can be an important (internal) source of R&D funding, they are not solely for R&D purposes obviously: retained earnings can be used for non-R&D related physical investments (as expansion of their businesses, e.g.) as well. On the other hand, firms may be able to finance their R&D projects using part of their funds raised by issuing equities and/or attracting venture capitals, or by obtaining external funding from banks or government R&D promotion programs. Besides the qualitative difference between the R&D investment and profit reinvestment, their weak correlation also shows that they are not linked quantitatively in any significant pattern, although they are both affected by the degree of property rights protection, as our findings shown next and those documented by Cull and Xu (2005) .
Legal environment and contract enforcement
In our study, the empirical analysis includes two variables related to the legal environment and contract enforcement. The first is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm usually signs written contracts with its clients (Contract). Since a firm will sign a contract only if it expects it to have some disciplinary effect in a business dispute, the variable is used as a proxy of a firm's confidence in the contract enforcement system (Cull and Xu, 2005) . The second variable we use (Contract Upheld) is the manager's response to the question: "What is the likelihood that the legal system will uphold my contract and property rights in business disputes?" The responses to the question range from 0 to 1, with a mean of 64% and standard deviation of 39%. As explained in the model, a better legal environment and contract enforcement should enhance a firm's R&D incentive.
Government helping hand and grabbing hand
The key independent variables of our study depict the government's role in property rights protection, law and contract enforcement, and direct ownership and control of enterprises.
Following the recent literature (e.g., Johnson et al., 2002, and Cull and Xu, 2005) , we divide the relevant variables into three groups: (1) variables that measure the extent of the helping and/or grabbing hand of the government; (2) variables that measure the ease and reliability of contract enforcement; and (3) variables that measure government ownership and control of firms. In this section, we focus on the first group of variables. The other two groups will be discussed in the following sections.
The first measure we use is based on the key question in the survey concerning the extent to which the government acts as a helping rather than a grabbing hand (Helping Hand Table 3 , we see that CEO nominations need to be approved by the government for about 5% to 22% of the firms in the surveyed cities.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Other firm control variables
In addition to the variables discussed above, our analysis also includes several enterpriselevel controls, such as market competition, firm size, firm profitability, access to finance, and firm age. The so-called Schumpeterian hypothesis claims that R&D is fostered either by a climate in which firms are large or in industries that have less competition. 11 Therefore, we use market structure and firm size as two important firm-based control variables. These two variables are used extensively in the literature as important R&D determinants (e.g. Scherer, 1992; Cohen and Klepper, 1996) . A widely used measure of market competition is the number of competitors (Nickell, 1996) . In the survey, the relevant question concerns the number of domestic competitors faced by the firm in its main business line or service (Competition One way to understand the negative correlation between private ownership and confidence in the court system in China is as follows. During its current stage of economic development, China's judicial system is far from independent. In fact, SOEs are more likely to prevail in court disputes, relative to privately owned firms. Similarly, FIEs may also be treated more generously by courts in China in business disputes, possibly because of that attracting FDI has been a top priority of local governments which often can influence decisions of local courts.(e.g., Huang (2003) argues that China's huge FDI may partly due to favorite treatments such as tax subsidies and access to loans received by foreign invested enterprises (FIEs)).
[Insert Table 4 here]
Our empirical analysis also includes city and industry fixed effects to control for the potential differences in economic development and institutions across regions and the technological differences across industries 14 .
Empirical Results
12 For example, Wenzhou is the city where development of private ownership and innovation is among the most successful in China, and yet it registers the lowest in terms of Contract Upheld among the 18 cities in our sample. 13 In the data, SOEs have shown greater confidence on government's ability to uphold contract than private firms and their difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 14 Alternatively, we include several city-level variables such as the natural logarithm of city GDP (GDP), the natural logarithm of city population (Population), the growth of GDP (GDP Growth), and the number of educational institutions in the city (Educational Institutions) as additional controls in our regressions. The empirical results are highly consistent with our current findings. For brevity, the empirical results are not reported but available from the authors. Instead, in our following regressions, we only report results with city and industry dummies as control variables.
Base Results
We first employ the Probit model to explore the potential determinants of a firm's likelihood of investing in R&D. The probability (likelihood) function of spending on R&D is expressed as follows: 
where is the standard normal cumulative distribution (cdf) in the Probit model, which can be expressed as , where
Firm characteristics are captured by a vector of control variables, which include the number of competitors, firm size, firm age, and access to finance. Macro control is simply city dummy or city GDP, city population, GDP growth, and the number of colleges and institutions within the city.
[ Table 5 here]
The results of the Probit models are presented in Table 5 Our results provide strong evidence that both the government helping hand and property rights protection encourage corporate R&D. Specifically, the variables related to legal environment and contract enforcement are of hypothesized signs, although the coefficient of Contract Upheld is statistically insignificant in the models. Firm managers who express greater faith that their property rights will be protected by the contract and upheld by the legal system tend to be more likely to invest in R&D. The coefficient of Contract is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level across all different specifications.
The coefficients of Helping Hand are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in all specifications, suggesting that an increase in the helpfulness of government officials results in a higher probability of investing in R&D. Similarly, the coefficients of Efficient Service are positive and statistically significant in all but one specifications. The aforementioned findings indicate the importance of the government's helping hand and efficient service in determining a firm's R&D decisions. Firms that express greater confidence in the government's helping hand and efficient service are more likely to invest in R&D projects. Finally, Informal payments does not have a statistically significant effect on a firm's R&D decisions. This may be partially due to the very modest size of the informal payments in the sample.
Ownership and control are found to have a great impact on R&D investment decisions. In contrast to SOEs, private firms and joint ventures are more likely to invest in R&D projects. As As mentioned earlier, another way the state can use a firm to pursue its goals is to exert control over the firm's management selection process and select top managers who represent the state's interests. Our results in Table 5 show that firms with a government-appointed CEO and those with a government-approved CEO nomination are less likely to invest in R&D projects. In particular, the coefficients of the variable State-Appointed CEO are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in regressions (3)-(5) and marginally significant in regression (10). Regarding the control variables, we find that firm size and access to finance both are positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of a firm's R&D investment.
Consistent with our expectation, firm profitability is also positively associated with the likelihood of a firm's R&D investment. Market competition exerts a negative and statistically significant impact on the likelihood of R&D investment, which is consistent with the Schumpeterian hypothesis 17 . The analyses so far focus on the probability of undertaking R&D investment. We also explore the relationship between various covariates and the amount of R&D spending using the Tobit model. The empirical results are mostly consistent with our previous findings in the Probit model.
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The coefficients of the Probit models cannot be directly read like those in the OLS regressions. To get some sense of the magnitude of the effects, we estimate the marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the regressions. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. We find that the effects of property rights protection on corporate R&D are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. For instance, a firm that receives full support from the government (helping hand = 1)
is 6%-7% more likely to invest in R&D than a firm that receives no helping hand (helping hand = 0). A one standard deviation increase in government service efficiency would increase a firm's likelihood of conducting an R&D project by about 3%. Signing a contract leads to an 8% increase in the likelihood of conducting R&D. Regarding ownership and control variables, Private firms and JVs are 7% and 8% more likely to conduct R&D projects than are SOEs, respectively. Firms with state-approved CEO nominations are 6% less likely to invest in R&D projects. For brevity, the marginal effects are not reported in the table but available from the 17 City population is positively related to firm's R&D incentive. The number of local educational institutions also has a positive and statistically significant impact on the likelihood of R&D incentives, suggesting the potential collaboration between enterprises and educational institutions in R&D projects. To save the space, these results are not reported. 18 Specifically, we find that contract and contract enforcement exert positive impacts on R&D spending. Helping Hand and Efficient Service are positively and significantly associated with R&D spending while Informal payments is negatively associated with R&D spending though the effect is not statistically significant. In addition, private enterprises tend to invest more in R&D while firms with a government-appointed CEO tend to invest less in R&D. For brevity, the empirical results are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.
authors upon request.
Instrumental Variable Analysis
In our study, the potential endogeneity may not be a serious problem because it seems unlikely that an individual firm's R&D decision and investment will influence the property rights such as government expropriation and contract enforcement. Nevertheless, it is still possible that local government may have different treatments of firms based on their R&D investment and provide more "helping hands" including specific subsidies to high tech (or R&D intensive) firms.
In this regard, the Helping Hand or Efficient Services may be responding to R&D effort, which creates potential reverse causality problem. In addition, the potential endogeneity problems can also be caused by omitted fixed effects such as regional or industrial effects. In our analysis, we include the industry and city dummies to capture the unobserved fixed effects and therefore the endogeneity problem caused by omitted fixed effects should be less of a concern. Finally, as argued before, there may also be a possibility that our independent variables may contain measurement errors. To deal with this potential endogeneity and/or measurement problem, we need to use the instrumental variable analysis. However, it is not easy to find the instrumental variables since we have already controlled for many firm characteristics such as ownership, performance, size and age, etc. We therefore try to base the selection of instrumental variables on the recent development economics literature (Reinikka and Svesson, 2006; Fisman and Svesson, 2007) . Specifically, Fisman and Svensson (2007) try to overcome the similar endogeneity problems by using industry-location averages as instruments. They point out that if the endogeneity problem is specific to firms, but not industries or locations, then netting out this firm-specific component yields a property right measure that only depends on the underlying characteristics inherent to particular industries and/or locations (Reinikka and Svensson, 2006; Fisman and Svensson, 2007 Failure to reject the null hypothesis implied a failure to reject the validity of the instruments. As can be seen from table 6, we can not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid in all the model specifications. In addition, we conduct an F-test of the excluded exogenous variables in the first-stage regressions. The null hypothesis of the test is that the instruments do not explain cross-sectional differences in expropriation and contract enforcement measures. We reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level in all model specifications. Along with the other regressors, the instrumental variables explain about 53% -62% of the cross-country variation in potentially endogenous variables. For brevity, we only report the p-values of the F-tests in the last row of table 6. The first-stage regressions are available from the authors upon request. The standard IV Probit and IV Tobit (Newey, 1987) are used and the empirical results are presented in table 6.
[Insert Table 6 here]
As can be seen from table 6, the empirical results are robust to the instrumental variable 
Property Rights Protection and Product and Process Innovations
As mentioned in Section 2, R&D investments can lead to product or process innovation.
While there are a lot of discussions and analysis of product and process R&D in the vast literature on industrial innovation (see, e.g., Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Lin, 2004; Lin and Saggi, 2002; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Utterback and Abernathy, 1983) , data (whether aggregate or firm level) rarely exist for the two categories of R&D. To examine the impacts of property rights protection on the types of R&D or innovative activities undertaken by the firms, we categorize the five types of innovation activities into product innovation (if the firm answers "Yes" to question (1) or (2)) and process innovation (if the firm answers "Yes" to (3), (4) or (5)) and repeat the analysis. 19 The empirical results are reported in table 7.
[Insert Table 7 here]
As can be seen in table 7, property rights protection also exerts significant impacts on product and process innovations. Specifically, we find that Contract is positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of process innovation. Contract Upheld exerts positive and statistically significant impacts on the likelihood of both process and product innovations, suggesting that firm managers who express greater faith that their property rights will be protected by the contract and upheld by the legal system are more likely to invest in (and introduce) both product or process R&D. Efficient Service is positively associated with the likelihood of process innovation. Regarding ownership and control, firms with greater private ownership are more likely to invest in (and introduce) both product and process innovations;
while the firms with government -approved CEOs are less likely to do so. Regarding the control variables, ROS, firm size and firm age take the average value across 1999 to 2002. Average profitability, access to finance and firm size are positively associated with the likelihood of product and process innovations while competition and firm age are negatively associated with the likelihood of product and process innovations. Overall, we find that property rights protection and government grabbing/helping hand both have significant impacts on firms' 19 We thank a referee for suggesting considering the types of R&D activity.
decisions in both types of R&D, which are consistent with our previous findings on total R&D spendings.
Property Rights Protection and R&D: Split Sample Analysis
Cull and Xu (2005) [Insert Table 8 here]
Unlike the findings in Cull and Xu (2005) , property rights protection matters in both large and small firms. As can be seen from the table, Contract exerts positive and statistically significant impacts on the likelihood of investing in R&D for both large and small firms. We find a positive effect of Contract Upheld on the likelihood of investing in R&D in small firms. The effect, however, is not statistically significant in large firms. Regarding the expropriation measures, R&D decisions in large firms are more sensitive to the efficiency of government service, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficients of Efficient Service;
while the R&D decisions in small firms are more sensitive to government helping hand (Helping Hand) and grabbing hand (Informal Payment), suggesting that small firms tend to be more fearful of expropriation than large firms. This finding echoes that of Cull and Xu (2005) , who find that informal payment is negatively associated with reinvestment rate only in small firms.
The effects of ownership and control are significant only in large firms. For large firms, we find
(1) a positive link between private ownership and the likelihood of corporate R&D and an inversed U-shape relationship between foreign ownership and the likelihood of corporate R&D.
In addition, we find that large firms with CEO approved or appointed by government are less likely to invest in R&D. Unlike the findings in Cull and Xu (2005) , the effects of ownership and control are not statistically significant in small firms. The results suggest that the politically connected CEOs in large companies have more concerns about their political career and are therefore more willing to gain the political credit and maximize their careers and their movement up the political hierarchy. In contrast, CEOs in small firms might have more concerns about the operation and economic performance of the enterprises and consequently the effects of ownership and control are not statistically significant in small firms.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine the effects of property rights protection and government services on corporate R&D, using an unique World Bank survey data on 2,400 firms in 18
Chinese cities in 2003. The survey data provide detailed information on firm R&D, managers' perceived degree of property rights protection and the service quality of local governments, as well as firm ownership and financial data. We find that (1) property rights protection in terms of contract enforcement plays an essential role in promoting corporate R&D (in terms of both the decision to engage in R&D and its intensity); (2) when the government extends a helping hand and provides efficient services to corporations, it promotes a firm's innovative activities; by contrast, when the government engages in expropriation of firm profits, firm R&D is discouraged; and (3) direct government ownership of a firm and intervention in CEO appointments do not facilitate corporate R&D.
Our study is among the first attempts to examine empirically the effects of property rights protection on R&D and economic development. It contributes to the recent emerging literature that emphasizes the importance of economic institutions in explaining differences in economic growth among countries. It also adds to the vast literature on R&D which has focused mostly on intellectual property rights protection. An important policy implication for developing countries is that establishing a modern system of property rights protection and contract enforcement is vital to R&D and long term economic growth. Note: The summary statistics are based on the observations in year 2002. Note: The regressions are run with probit, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering within firms. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P-values based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. P-values are in parentheses. Following Fisman and Svensson (2007) Note: Product Innovation is a dummy variable which takes on the value one if the firm has introduced new products or entered new business line since 1999, and zero otherwise. Process Innovation is a dummy variable which takes on the value one if the firm has introduced new process improvements, new management techniques or new quality control in production process since 1999, and zero otherwise. The regressions are run with probit, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering within firms. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P-values based on robust standard errors are in parentheses.***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. P-values based on robust standard errors are in parentheses Note: Large firms are the firms with firm size above sample median. Small firms are the firms with firm size below sample median. The regressions are run with probit, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation with heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors clustering within firms. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Pvalues based on robust standard errors are in parentheses.
